

Advising the Congress on Medicare issues

Realigning incentives in Medicare Part D


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Why Part D needs to be restructured

- Rapid growth in Medicare's cost-based payments
 - Medicare's reinsurance pays for 80% of catastrophic spending
 - Low-income subsidy (LIS) pays for nearly all cost sharing of LIS enrollees
- Part D's benefit design dampens incentives to manage spending
 - Coverage-gap discount distorts relative prices of brands to generics
 - Low plan liability in coverage gap and catastrophic phase
 - Manufacturer rebates can be larger than plan liability
- Program design may influence manufacturers' pricing and lead to higher:
 - Beneficiary coinsurance
 - Medicare program spending


Misaligned incentives in Part D



Key elements of the restructured Part D benefit

	Current benefit	Restructured benefit
Phase-in period	n/a	4 years
Below OOP threshold		
Enrollee cost sharing between deductible and ICL	25%	25%
Plan liability between deductible and ICL	75%	75%
Coverage gap?	Yes	No
Brand manufacturer discount	70% in coverage gap	None
Projected OOP threshold in 2022	\$3,100 (\$7,100)*	\$3,100
Total spending at OOP threshold	About \$11,000	About \$11,000
Above OOP threshold (catastrophic phase)		
Enrollee cost sharing	5%	0%
Medicare reinsurance	80%	20%
Plan liability	15%	50% for brands and high-priced generics 80% for lower-price generics
Manufacturer discount**	0%	30% for brands and high-priced generics

How Part D would be restructured



- 75% plan liability between the deductible and OOP threshold
- No cost sharing above the OOP threshold
- Shift catastrophic insurance risk from Medicare to plans and manufacturers

Related policy changes would help ensure a successful transition to a restructured benefit

- Implementation of new benefit structure
 - Phase in higher plan liability in catastrophic phase
 - Recalibrate Part D's risk-adjusters to ensure adequate payments and discourage plans from engaging in risk selection
 - Temporarily make risk corridors more generous
- Give plans new tools to manage drug spending
 - Differentiate LIS cost sharing for preferred & nonpreferred drugs
 - Allow plans to use a nonpreferred tier for specialty drugs
 - Give plans greater flexibility in the protected drug classes

Draft recommendation #1

The Congress should make the following changes to the Part D prescription drug benefit:

- Below the out-of-pocket threshold:
 - Eliminate the initial coverage limit.
 - Eliminate the coverage-gap discount program.
- Above the out-of-pocket threshold:
 - Eliminate enrollee cost sharing.
 - Transition Medicare's reinsurance subsidy from 80 percent to 20 percent.
 - Require pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide a discount equal to no less than 30 percent of the negotiated price for brand drugs, biologics, biosimilars, and high-cost generic drugs.

Draft recommendation #2

Concurrent with our recommended changes to the benefit design, the Congress should:

- Establish a higher copayment amount under the low-income subsidy for nonpreferred and nonformulary drugs.
- Give plan sponsors greater flexibility to manage the use of drugs in the protected classes.
- Modify the program's risk corridors to reduce plans' aggregate risk during the transition to the new benefit structure.

Draft recommendation #3

Concurrent with our recommended changes to the benefit design, the Secretary should:

- Allow plans to establish preferred and nonpreferred tiers for specialty-tier drugs.
- Recalibrate Part D's risk adjusters to reflect the higher benefit liability that plans bear under the new benefit structure.

Spending implications of draft recommendations

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the combination of the Commission's three recommendations would lead to:

- 1-year program savings greater than \$2 billion
- 5-year program savings greater than \$10 billion

Implications of draft recommendations for beneficiaries

- More complete financial protection for all non-LIS beneficiaries
- Improved access to drug therapies in catastrophic phase
- No change in out-of-pocket (OOP) spending for LIS beneficiaries using preferred drugs
- No change or reduced OOP spending for beneficiaries using preferred specialty-tier drugs
- Some beneficiaries would need to switch medications, pay higher nonpreferred cost sharing, or seek exceptions
- Effects on beneficiary premiums would depend on the catastrophic discount rate and other factors

Implications of draft recommendations for plan sponsors

- Stronger incentives to manage spending
- Reduces financial benefit of high-price, high-rebate drugs
- No catastrophic cost sharing may make it more difficult to manage spending in that phase
- Greater leverage to negotiate manufacturer rebates for some products
- Plans with high LIS enrollment will see larger increases in plan liability but also higher capitated payments after CMS recalibrates risk adjusters
- Modified risk corridors would provide financial protection during the transition to a new benefit structure and would be especially valuable to smaller plans
- Employer group waiver plans will receive less in manufacturer discounts

Implications of draft recommendations for pharmaceutical manufacturers

- Discount liability would shift from manufacturers of brand-name drugs and biologics with relatively low prices to manufacturers of drugs and biologics with higher prices
- Effects on manufacturer pricing decisions for existing products would vary
- Some manufacturers may experience lower Part D revenues or diminished ability to raise prices
- May lead to higher launch prices
- May change distribution of R&D spending

Summary of draft recommendations

- Major components
 - Plans become responsible for 75% of spending between the deductible and OOP threshold
 - Provide complete financial protection to non-LIS enrollees
 - Restructure the catastrophic benefit to shift insurance risk from Medicare to plan sponsors and pharmaceutical manufacturers
 - Provide plans with more tools and flexibility to manage spending
- ▶ Restore risk-based capitated approach
- ▶ Eliminate program features that distort market incentives