



Advising the Congress on Medicare issues

Assessing payment adequacy and updating payments: hospital inpatient, outpatient and LTCH payment policy

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Most payment adequacy indicators are positive

- Access to care is good
 - Excess capacity in most markets
 - Inpatient volumes declining
 - Outpatient growing
- Access to capital is adequate
- Quality of care is generally improving
 - 30-day mortality is declining
 - Readmissions are declining

Medicare margins are expected to decline slightly by 2014

	2012	2014
Aggregate overall Medicare margin	-5.4%	-6.0%

Why do we expect margins to decline slightly by 2014?

- Payment rate updates and case mix growth will increase revenue
- Cost growth is expected to be slightly larger than updates
- Policy changes from 2012 to 2014 largely offset each other

Note: the projected margin does not include the effect of the sequester. If it remains in effect, margins will be almost 2 percent lower in 2014.

Comparing 2012 performance of relatively efficient hospitals to others

Measure	Relatively efficient hospitals	Other hospitals
Number of hospitals	302	1,831
30-day mortality (rel. to avg.)	13% lower	3% above
30-day readmissions	4% lower	1% above
Standardized costs (rel. to avg.)	10% lower	2% above
Overall Medicare margin	2%	-6%
Share of patients rating the hospital highly	69%	68%

Note: Hospitals are classified as efficient based on 2009 to 2011 performance. In this slide, 2012 medians for each group are compared to the national median
 Source: Medicare cost reports, claims data, and hospital compare

Expected 2015 payment changes under current law

	Current law
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Payment change estimates (2014 to 2015)	
DSH/uncompensated care payment	-2.0%
Other policy changes in current law	-1.5
Update (current law, draft recommendation)	2.2
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Effect on hospital payments	-1.3%
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Note: These projections are presented as changes in overall hospital Medicare fee-for-service revenue (not just inpatient revenue) which is about \$170 billion per year. The measures do not factor in any changes in volume of service. The DSH / uncompensated care changes could vary depending on the expansion of the insurance coverage under the exchanges and the degree of Medicaid expansion.

Reducing incentives to shift care to higher-cost settings

- Problem: Price distortions encourage providers to shift care to higher-cost sites without any evidence of improved outcomes
- Solution: remove the pricing distortions
 - OPPS: Pay hospitals rates that are comparable to physician office rates for services that can safely be provided in physician offices
 - LTCH / IPPS: Pay LTCHs acute care hospital inpatient rates for less-severely ill LTCH patients. Pay acute care hospital higher payments for the most-costly “LTCH-type” patients

Billing of services shifting from offices to outpatient departments

Type of service	Volume change freestanding office		Volume change OPD	
	2011	2012	2011	2012
E&M office visits	-1%	-1%	8%	9%
Echocardiogram	-7	-9	18	13
Nuclear cardiology	-13	-16	14	9

Source: Medicare claims data

Note: OPD (hospital outpatient department).

Preliminary data subject to change

Aligning payment rates in OPDs and freestanding offices

- Medicare and beneficiaries pay \$2.1 billion more annually for E&M and other services than if OPD rates aligned with office rates
- Criteria for service to have equal rates across settings
 - More than 50% of volume in offices
 - Minimal packaging differences between settings
 - Infrequently provided with ED visit
 - Patient severity no greater in OPDs
 - Not a 90-day global code in the physician fee schedule

Services where payment rates could be equal or differences narrowed

- Group 1: APCs meet 5 criteria; payment rates across settings could be equal
- Group 2: APCs where payment rate differences could be narrowed; rates higher in OPDs because of more packaging in OPPS
- For 2010, 24 APCs in Group 1; 42 in Group 2

Impact on hospitals of payment rate changes for 66 APCs

- Adjusting payment rates in these 66 APCs
 - Reduce hospital program spending and cost sharing by \$1.1 billion per year
 - Reduce hospitals' Medicare revenue by 0.6%
- Rural and small hospitals affected more
- Mitigating impact of payment rate changes
 - Illustrative example: Limit losses to 2% of overall revenue for hospitals that have DSH > median

Reforming the LTCH PPS

- Maintain separate LTCH payment system with higher rates only for chronically critically ill (CCI) cases
- Non-CCI paid IPPS-based rates
- All LTCH cases (CCI and non-CCI) eligible for LTCH outlier payments (8% outlier pool)
- 25+ day ALOS requirement applied only to CCI cases
- Savings would be transferred to IPPS outlier pool to boost payments for IPPS CCI cases

MedPAC definition of chronically critically ill (CCI)

- 8+ ICU days during preceding ACH stay; OR
- Prolonged mechanical ventilation services during preceding ACH stay
- 41% of current LTCH cases
- 6% of current IPPS cases

Why this definition of CCI?

- Literature describes CCI cases as having long hospital stays with heavy use of ICU services
- Participants in CMS panel discussions defined appropriate LTCH cases as “stable post-ICU patients”
- PAC Demonstration found that ICU LOS was the most important predictor of resource intensity in the LTCH
- Fewer ICU days allows less-complex patients to qualify

Impact of LTCH payment reform (assumes no behavioral change)


LTCH

- -\$2 billion
- 41% of cases = CCI
59% paid IPPS rates
- Avg. impact: -36.5% in year 3. Greater for LTCHs that are:
 - For-profit
 - In LTCH-saturated areas
 - Low CCI

IPPS

- +\$2 billion (outlier pmts)
- 6% of cases eligible
- Avg. impact: 1.8% in year 3. Greater for hospitals that are:
 - Major teaching
 - Low margin
 - In areas with fewer LTCHs

LTCH margins by share of CCI cases



Preliminary data subject to change

Historically, LTCHs have been responsive to payment incentives

- Behavior changes expected
 - Admission of more CCI cases
 - More selective admission of non-CCI cases
 - Reduced LOS for non-CCI cases

Hypothetical example:

Non-CCI case, current policy	Non-CCI case, 1 st year of transition to new policy
Payment = \$40,000	Payment = \$30,360
Cost/day = \$1,500	Cost/day = \$1,500
LOS = 25 days	LOS = 20 days
Cost/discharge = \$37,500	Cost/discharge = \$30,000