




# The Extended Hospital Medical Staff *Multi-specialty group practice for all?*

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How can the best medical care in the world cost twice as much as the best medical care in the world?

### Variations in spending

What do higher spending regions -- and systems -- get?

Resource levels<sup>1</sup> More hospital beds per capita (32%)

*More medical specialists (65%) and internists (75%)* 

Content / Quality of Care<sup>1,2</sup> Technical quality worse

No more major elective surgery

More hospital stays, visits, specialist use, tests, procedures

Health Outcomes<sup>1,2</sup>
Slightly higher mortality
No better function

Physician-reported quality<sup>5</sup> Worse communication among physicians

Greater difficulty ensuring continuity of care Greater difficulty providing high quality care

Patient-reported quality<sup>1,3</sup>

Lower satisfaction with hospital care

Worse access to primary care

Trends over time<sup>4</sup>

Supply-sensitive services

Lower gains in survival (following AMI)

Greater growth in per-capita resource use

(1) Ann Intern Med: 2003; 138: 273-298

Supply-sensitive services

- (2) Health Affairs web exclusives, October 7, 2004
- (3) Health Affairs, web exclusives, Nov 16, 2005
- (4) Health Affairs web exclusives, Feb 7, 2006
- (5) Ann Intern Med: 2006; 144: 641-649

### Likely diagnosis

Local capacity and culture drive spending: and no one is accountable


Clinical evidence (e.g. RCTs, guidelines) and principles of professionalism are a critically important -- but limited -- influence on clinical decision-making.

Physicians practice within a local organizational context and policy environment that profoundly influences their decision-making. Payment system ensures that existing (and new capacity) is fully utilized.

Consequence: *reasonable* individual clinical and local decisions lead, in aggregate, to higher utilization rates, greater costs -- *and inadvertently* -- worse outcomes

Clinical Evidence
Professionalism

Physical Evidence
Physical Evidence



## A possible approach Foster local accountability

#### Theory: strengthen local organizational accountability:

Decisions about capacity: investment, recruitment, practice location

Longitudinal costs and quality

Care coordination and communication

#### **Potential approaches:**

Individual physicians (advanced medical home)

Established multi-specialty group practices

#### Hospital medical staff

Welch-Miller proposed in early 1990's for inpatient stays

We extend this idea to include all patients and physicians

### The Extended Hospital Medical Staff

#### Empirical work addresses four areas:

Feasibility

Characteristics (do they have face validity?)

Performance measurement

EHMS as framework for assessing volume growth

#### Discussion

### The Extended Hospital Medical Staff

### Empirical work addresses four areas:

Feasibility of using claims data to define EHMS

### Methods / Feasibility

Defining a Hospital's Extended Medical Staff

#### General Approach:

**MDs with inpatient work** -- assigned to the hospital where they provided care to the greatest number of Medicare beneficiaries

**MDs with no inpatient work** -- assigned to the hospital where the plurality of patients they billed for were admitted.

Results: *virtually all physicians billing Medicare can be assigned* 602,540 with valid UPINs in 20% Part B, Outpt or Inpatient File Exclude 31,020: non-US hospital, unassignable MD, unknown specialty 571,520 (95%) assigned to acute care hospitals located in U.S.

### Methods / Feasibility

#### Defining the populations they serve

#### Approach for Ambulatory Care (all Medicare beneficiaries)

- 1. Assign each patient to their <u>predominant care physician</u> (primary care MD or medical subspecialist, then others)
- 2. **Primary Hospital**: Assign to their primary hospital (based on their *physicians*' assignment)
- 3. **Secondary Hospital:** Identify the secondary hospital used by each hospital's patients (usually a referral hospital).

Results: Virtually all Medicare beneficiaries can be assigned

- 5.5 million beneficiaries in 20% sample; age 65+, non-HMO exclude 386,621 with no outpatient MD visits exclude 70,477 outside US
- 5.1 million (93%) assigned to a U.S. acute care hospital

#### Overview of Talk

### Empirical work addresses four areas:

Feasibility of using claims data to define EHMS

Characteristics of resulting EHMS (do they have face validity?)

## Face Validity and Coherence of Defined EHMS


Characteristics of Medical Staff (specialty mix)

	Average	<b>Urban or Large Town</b>			Rural	
	All US	Large	Med.	Small	Large	Small
Number of hospitals		766	1708	568	368	1362
Percent of physicians		53	38	2	4	3
Percent of beneficiaries		48	37	3	6	7
MD or DO per 100 beds	_					
Primary Care	30	30	29	30	28	27
Medical Specialist	21	26	18	8	12	5
Surgeon	21	25	20	11	15	7
Other	37	45	34	18	25	11
Total	88	103	83	57	66	45

# Face Validity and Coherence of Defined EHMS Affiliation (direct or indirect) of physicians with hospitals

62% of physicians perform inpatient work Of these:


38% work at multiple hospitals



# Face Validity and Coherence of Defined EHMS Affiliation (direct or indirect) of physicians with hospitals

62% of physicians perform inpatient work Of these:

38% work at multiple hospitals 75% of their work is at their assigned primary hospital




62% of physicians work at only one hospital 100% of their work is at this "primary" hospital

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Overall, 90% of physicians' inpatient work is at their assigned "primary" hospital


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
62% of physicians perform inpatient work *Of these:* 

38% perform no inpatient work. Of these:

56% of admissions for their patients are at their assigned "primary" hospital




Overall, 90% of physicians' inpatient work is at their assigned "primary" hospital



#### Coherence -- Concentration of Care

Percent of beneficiaries' care at assigned primary or secondary hospital



#### Overview of Talk

#### Empirical work addresses four areas:

Feasibility of using claims data to define EMHS

Characteristics of resulting EMHS (do they have face validity?)

Performance measurement: individual MD vs EHMS

## How many physicians have enough ambulatory patients assigned? \*Percent of physicians caring for panels of various sizes\*\*

	Assessed as Ind	ividual Physicians	Assessed as members of EHMS	
	Among MDs with $1+$ patient assigned $(n = 254,250)$	Among all MDs (n = 572,637)	Among all MDs $(n = 572,637)$	
No patients	0	56	0	
1 to 24	36	16	0.3	
25-99	30	13	0.7	
100-499	32	15	1.3	
500 and over	1	1	97.7	
	100%	100%	100%	

## Feasibility of performance measurement

2003 average performance, stratified by 2003 MD spending\*

	Low Spending	Middle	High Spending	Ratio High to Low
Mammography 65-69	47.8	48.6	47.2	0.87
Colorectal Cancer screen	11.5	13.2	16.4	1.30
Eye exams, diabetes	39.0	40.5	41.5	0.98
HBA1c, diabetes	54.9	56.5	54.5	0.92
Hospital Discharges§	330	367	390	1.18
SNF stays §	74.3	75.7	81.7	1.10
Care transitions	0.86	0.92	0.97	1.26
Physician services**	\$2,085	\$2,560	\$3,295	1.58
Acute care hospital	\$2,086	\$2,432	\$2,649	1.26

<sup>\*</sup> Defined using 2003 RVUs

<sup>\*\*</sup> Physician and hospital spending calculated using standardized national prices (spending and utilization data are age-sex-race adjusted)

<sup>§</sup> per 1000 beneficiares

### Feasibility of performance measurement

2003 average performance, stratified by 2003 MD spending\*

	Low Spending	High Spending	Ratio High to Low
Mammography 65-69	47.8	47.2	0.99
Colorectal Cancer screen	11.5	16.4	1.43
Eye exams, diabetes	39.0	41.5	1.06
HBA1c, diabetes	54.9	54.5	0.99
Physician services*	\$2,085	\$3,295	1.58
Acute care hospital	\$2,086	\$2,649	1.29

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Performance measurement: individual MD vs EMHS

EMHS as framework for assessing volume growth

## Approaches to assessing volume growth

All services **billed** by medical staff (including for patients not assigned)

All services provided to their assigned patients, regardless of where or by whom.

#### Advantages

Attribution and responsibility are absolutely clear for services billed.

#### Disadvantages

Population served can fluctuate, distorting interpretation.

Cannot easily expand beyond Part B to include all services.

#### Disadvantages

Out-of-system care is not directly controlled by primary staff.

#### Advantages


Population served is well defined, providing stable denominator for rates.

Measurement can expand to include all services, not just Part B.

Incentives are to manage care of the population served and reduce their per-beneficiary costs.

We therefore focused this analysis on the assigned patients

# Growth in spending on physician services at EHMS stratified by average absolute growth across HRRs



# Discussion Advantages of EHMS as locus of accountability

#### Performance measurement more tractable at EHMS level

Can include all physicians who contribute to care within frame of measurement immediately -- with adequate sample sizes

Broader measures: quality, outcomes, coordination, costs.

May face lower resistance from physicians than individual reporting.

More practical: 5000 units to audit vs 500,000

#### Establishes a locus of accountability for capacity

No other logical candidate

SGR like formula would create incentives to constrain capacity growth

#### Hospitals can intervene to improve quality

Finance electronic health records for associated physicians Implement quality improvement initiatives

## Discussion Barriers shouldn't be dismissed

Current market going in the opposite direction

Lack of physician organizational structures

Legal obstacles

Variation across hospitals and markets in coherence

## Discussion How might we move forward?

#### Enhance coherence of hospital medical staff

Provide incentive for physicians to choose hospital with which they wish to be affiliated (e.g small increment in conversion factor).

Provide incentives for beneficiaries to choose responsible physician

Financial incentives for shared Electronic Medical Record (EMR)

#### Report performance measures at EHMS level

#### Payment reform

Shared savings demonstrations (public-private?)

Establish growth pools at EHMS level