Moving Forward From the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) System

February 14, 2013

Statement of
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Chairman
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission

Before the
Subcommittee on Health
Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Waxman, Subcommittee Chairman Pitts, Subcommittee Ranking Member Pallone, distinguished Committee members. I am Glenn Hackbarth, chairman of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC). I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning to discuss MedPAC’s approach to moving forward from the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system.

The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission is a Congressional support agency that provides independent, nonpartisan policy and technical advice to the Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. The Commission’s goal is to achieve a Medicare program that assures beneficiary access to high-quality care, pays health care providers and plans fairly, rewards efficiency and quality, and spends tax dollars responsibly.

Each year, MedPAC conducts an analysis of payment adequacy for physician and other health professional services. This analysis covers a range of issues—access to care, quality, and changes in volume and intensity of Medicare-covered services. MedPAC has also considered other approaches to improving the Medicare program, including delivery system reforms (such as accountable care organizations) and the role that physicians and other health professionals would play in those reforms. However, given the focus of this hearing, this testimony focuses solely on the Commission’s recent work regarding the SGR system.

**Background**

Physicians and other health professionals deliver a wide range of services to Medicare beneficiaries, including office visits, surgical procedures, and diagnostic and therapeutic services in a variety of settings. In 2011, the Medicare program paid $68 billion for physician and other health professional services, 12 percent of total Medicare spending.

Medicare pays physicians and other health professionals (such as nurse practitioners or therapists) using a fee schedule that includes payment rates for over 7,000 separate billing codes. Weights for work, practice expense and malpractice insurance are set for each code and are designed to reflect the resources needed on average to provide the service. The sum of the weights is multiplied by a dollar amount called the conversion factor, which produces the total
payment amount for each service. So on net, Medicare’s payments for physician services are a function of the number of services the physician orders and the rate for each of those services.

The old system of Medicare physician payment was similar to that used by private insurers. It was based on a percentage (e.g., 75 percent) of prevailing charges in a market and proved to be highly inflationary.¹ Providers learned that by raising charges, they could increase their payments from private insurers and Medicare. Moreover, it resulted in distortions among services and specialties (i.e., primary care vs. procedural based specialties) because certain specialties were more able to raise charges than others.² The Medicare physician fee schedule (PFS) was developed by a Harvard physician in consultation with panels of practicing physicians.³ Upon implementation in 1992 it was intended to rationalize payments across services based on the time a service took to provide and the level of intensity it required, and it was also intended to narrow the differences between primary care/cognitive services and procedural services.⁴ However, an additional concern was the volume of physician services. As noted above, physicians are able to order more or fewer services, and Medicare has gone through periods of high volume growth.⁵ When the PFS was implemented there were concerns that physicians would respond to fee adjustments by generating more service volume. This led to volume-control policies, such as the SGR, being tied to physician payment.

Under current law, the conversion factor is governed by the SGR formula, which creates a limit on aggregate growth in payments to physicians and other health professionals by reducing the conversion factor if the SGR targets are exceeded. The SGR formula allows for growth in input prices, enrollment, and changes in law and regulation. The SGR formula also allows for volume growth equal to the rate of growth in per capita gross domestic product (GDP). As a result, the

The differential between GDP and volume is an important factor. A rationale for setting GDP as the volume target is that national output—or GDP—reflects a measure of affordability, as government tax collections have generally remained a constant share of national output. And Medicare Part B, which funds physician and other health professional services, receives the bulk of its financing from tax collections.

The resulting SGR formula has produced negative payment updates every year since 2003 due to increases in volume and intensity beyond those permitted by the SGR. However, the Congress has implemented short-term overrides of these negative payment adjustments every year since 2003. On January 2, 2013, the estimated 27 percent payment cut to physician fees under the SGR was overridden, and payment rates will remain at their 2012 level until the end of 2013. With the significant accumulation in spending that must be recouped under the SGR, repealing it has a high budgetary cost.

**The Commission’s position on the SGR system**

The SGR is fundamentally flawed and is creating instability in the Medicare program for providers and beneficiaries. The Commission recommends that the Congress repeal the SGR system for many reasons. First, the SGR system, which ties annual updates to cumulative expenditures, has failed to restrain volume growth and may have exacerbated it (Figure 1).

While some physicians and other health professionals contribute to the inappropriate volume growth that has resulted in large payment adjustments through the SGR, others have restrained volume (Figure 2). But the SGR does not differentiate between physicians who restrain volume and physicians who do not restrain volume.
Figure 1. Volume growth has caused spending to increase faster than input prices and updates, 2000-2011

- Spending per beneficiary
- MEI
- Updates

Note: MEI (Medicare Economic Index). The MEI is a measure of input prices for physician services. Updates are actual payment updates for the physician fee schedule.


Figure 2. Growth in the volume of practitioner services, 2000-2011

- Imaging
- Tests
- Other procedures
- E&M services
- Major procedures

Note: E&M (evaluation and management). Volume growth for E&M from 2009 to 2010 is not directly observable due to a change in payment policy for consultations. To compute cumulative volume growth for E&M through 2011, we used a growth rate for 2009 to 2010 of 1.85 percent, which is the average of the 2008 to 2009 growth rate of 1.7 percent and the 2010 to 2011 growth rate of 2.0 percent.

Source: MedPAC analysis of claims data for 100 percent of Medicare beneficiaries.
Second, temporary, stop-gap fixes to override the SGR undermine the credibility of the Medicare program because they engender uncertainty and anger among physicians and other health professionals, which may in turn cause anxiety among beneficiaries. Third, the short-term overrides have led to an administrative burden for providers and CMS due to holding of claims, delays in submission of claims, and reprocessing of claims.

The Commission laid out its findings and recommendations for moving forward from the SGR system in its October 2011 letter to the Congress, attached to this testimony as an appendix. Several principles embody our position:

- Repeal of the SGR is urgent.
- Beneficiary access must be preserved.
- The physician fee schedule must be rebalanced to achieve equity of payments between primary care and other specialties.
- Pressure on fee-for-service (FFS) must encourage movement toward new payment models and delivery systems.
- Repeal of the SGR should be done in a fiscally responsible way.

**Repeal is urgent**

The presence of the SGR and the temporary, stop-gap fixes to the SGR have had a destabilizing influence on the Medicare program by creating uncertainty for physicians, other health professionals, and beneficiaries.

Two reasons have often been given for delaying repeal: the large budgetary cost of repeal and concern about reverting to FFS payment without any limit on volume growth or change in incentives. CBO’s recent re-estimation of the cost of repeal may reduce fiscal concerns about repeal or at least make it more feasible to find acceptable offsets. Similarly, implementation of ACOs as a new payment model is a significant first step toward addressing incentives for volume growth in a more effective, and equitable, manner than the SGR. Other new payment models,
including bundling around hospital episodes and patient-centered medical homes, are now being pilot tested.

In our judgment, further delaying SGR repeal would expose beneficiaries to increasing risk of impaired access, and the budget score attached to repeal could begin to increase again (discussed below). Moreover, the array of new models for paying physicians and other health professionals is unlikely to change dramatically in the next few years. Rather than wait longer, we urge the Congress to repeal the SGR now and to begin rewarding physicians and other professionals as they shift their practices from open-ended FFS to accountable care organizations (ACOs). As additional new payment models move from pilot stage to implementation, similar incentives may be established for them. By committing to this course now, the Congress could stimulate physician interest in new payment models and thus accelerate their development and adoption.

Volatility in the cost estimates for repealing the SGR is another reason to repeal the formula now. The estimates depend on projections of growth in the volume and intensity of services furnished by physicians and other health professionals and the relationship between that volume growth and growth in gross domestic product. The difficulty in making those estimates is that volume growth has proven to be unpredictable. According to GAO, volume growth per beneficiary in the 1980s ranged from at least 3.7 percent to 9.7 percent, and in the 1990s the range was −0.7 percent to 3.4 percent. According to the Commission’s analyses, volume growth per beneficiary since 2000 has ranged from 1.0 percent to 5.6 percent (Figure 3).

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It is unclear why volume growth has had such volatility. Reasons offered for the slowdown that started in 2009 include a mild flu season in 2010 (compared to 2009) and—in the case of decreases in the use of certain types of imaging services—concerns about radiation exposure. The Commission has found further that there has been a shift in billing for cardiovascular imaging from health professionals’ offices to hospitals, a shift that is consistent with reports of an increase in cardiologists’ practices owned by hospitals. In turn, the shift has implications for measures of volume growth, increasing the volume of services billed by hospitals but reducing the volume of services billed by physicians and other health professionals.

While uncertainty remains about the reasons for the volatility in volume growth, we do know that scoring estimates for repealing or replacing the SGR have fallen dramatically. Three months ago, before CBO incorporated the most recent experience with volume growth in their budget

estimates, the budget impact of a 10-year freeze was higher than it is today by more than $100 billion. However, the volatility in volume growth we have seen historically suggests that circumstances could change again—in the direction not of lower cost estimates but instead ones that are higher.

**Beneficiary access must be preserved**

Although our latest access survey does not show significant deterioration at the national level, the Commission is nonetheless concerned about access. The balance between supply and demand is tight in many markets, and problems have surfaced in some markets, particularly in primary care. Those problems could spread, perhaps rapidly. The Medicare population is growing as members of the baby-boom generation become eligible for the program, a large cohort of physicians is nearing retirement age, and SGR fatigue is increasing. We do not predict abrupt changes in the national access picture, but we cannot rule them out either.

Because SGR repeal is costly, it may be necessary to replace it with a 10-year schedule of low, or even negative, updates to the conversion factor. That new schedule of updates would establish a new budgetary baseline, but the conversion factors would not be immutable. Each year MedPAC will continue to review whether payments to physicians and other health professionals are adequate—through surveying beneficiaries, conducting physician and beneficiary focus groups, tracking practitioner participation in Medicare, and examining changes in volume and quality of ambulatory care. If, through these analyses, the Commission determines that a change in payment rates is needed to ensure adequate access, the Commission would make such a recommendation to the Congress.

**The physician fee schedule must be rebalanced to achieve equity of payments between primary care and other specialties**

The Commission finds it crucial to support primary care, considering that the most recent data show that access risks are concentrated in primary care. We see a higher share of beneficiaries in our annual patient survey reporting problems finding a primary care physician than those seeking a specialist, and primary care physicians are more likely to report that they are not taking new Medicare patients than are specialty physicians. The Commission is concerned that there is an

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imbalance between supply and demand in primary care, an imbalance that is likely to get worse, and this represents a market signal: the payment level for primary care is too low.

There are two ways to redress the imbalance between fees for primary care and specialty services. One is to improve the methods by which relative values are calculated under the Medicare fee schedule. The other is to use different conversion factors for primary care and specialty services (the primary care bonus in PPACA is a type of conversion factor adjustment). MedPAC believes both approaches are needed.

**Pressure on FFS must encourage movement toward new payment models and delivery systems**

The FFS payment system inherently encourages volume over quality and efficiency. The rapid volume growth over the last decade which led to the large payment cuts required under the SGR was partially due to the underlying volume incentives in FFS reimbursement. New payment models, such as ACOs and bundled payment, offer an opportunity to correct some of these undesirable incentives and have the potential to reward providers who control costs and improve quality. Incentives for providers to work across settings to improve quality and maximize efficiency are strongest in “risk-bearing” ACOs—where providers take financial risk for poor performance as well as being eligible for financial bonuses for good performance.

The Commission’s approach uses two policies to encourage movement from open-ended FFS to better managed models (e.g, risk-bearing ACOs). It creates pressure to exit FFS by reducing and restraining updates. And it encourages movement to an ACO by recommending a performance standard that does not reflect the lower updates. In this way physicians are given a clear opportunity to share in savings by joining an ACO. While movement to ACOs and other models should result in less volume growth, more importantly, they should result in greater coordination of care and ultimately better quality of care.

**SGR repeal must be fiscally responsible**

The Commission’s role is to make recommendations to the Congress that will preserve or enhance beneficiary access to quality care while minimizing the financial burden on beneficiaries and taxpayers. We take seriously our statutory charge to consider the budgetary consequences of our recommendations. Consistent with that charge, our October 2011 letter recommending SGR
repeal includes options for the Congress to consider as budget offsets on the assumption that repeal would need to be fully financed from within Medicare. It bears emphasis that MedPAC is NOT necessarily recommending that repeal be fully financed out of Medicare. Instead, our October 2011 letter offered options for the Congress to consider if it decided to pursue that path. Whether SGR repeal is offset, and how, is for the Congress to decide.

CBO recently lowered its estimate of the cost of repealing the SGR. This re-estimate may provide the Congress with somewhat more flexibility in choosing offsets as well as an appropriate schedule of updates for physicians and other health professionals. For example, the Congress could choose to stabilize payment rates for a period of time, then gradually impose conversion factor reductions for physicians who are not practicing within new payment models.

In considering budget packages to improve the government’s fiscal picture, the Congress often looks to Medicare for savings. If those savings are applied to deficit reduction and the SGR remains in place, it will become more difficult to offset the cost of replacing the SGR one or two years from now. At that point, the only option for dealing with an even larger score for SGR repeal may be to add it to the deficit, which may be unpalatable after much effort to get the deficit down.

MedPAC’s October 2011 letter on SGR repeal
The Commission’s October 2011 letter to the Congress on moving forward from the sustainable growth rate system is attached as an appendix to this testimony. Although the figures and budgetary estimates may be out of date, the letter continues to reflect the findings and principles that guide our recommendations. The letter provides more detail on each of the specific recommendations below.

The Commission made four distinct recommendations. First, the link between cumulative fee-schedule expenditures and annual conversion factor updates is unworkable and should be eliminated. In place of the SGR, the Commission outlined a 10-year path of legislated updates, including updates for primary care services that are different from those for other services.10

10 For primary care, payment rates would be frozen at their current levels. For all other services, there would be reductions in the fee schedule’s conversion factor in each of the first three years, and then a freeze in the conversion factor for the subsequent seven years.
Second, CMS should collect data to improve payment adequacy within the fee schedule. Third, CMS should identify overpriced services and adjust the RVUs of those services. And fourth, the Medicare program should encourage movement from FFS into risk-bearing ACOs by creating greater opportunities for shared savings.
Appendix
October 14, 2011

The Honorable Max Baucus
Chairman, Committee on Finance
U.S. Senate
219 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
Ranking Member, Committee on Finance
U.S. Senate
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Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Dave Camp
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means
U.S. House of Representatives
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Sander M. Levin
Ranking Member, Committee on Ways and Means
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The Honorable Fred Upton
Chairman, Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
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Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
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Washington, DC 20515

RE: Moving forward from the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system

Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:

The sustainable growth rate (SGR) system—Medicare’s formulaic payment method for services provided by physicians and other health professionals—is fundamentally flawed and is creating instability in the Medicare program for providers and beneficiaries. This system, which ties annual updates to cumulative expenditures since 1996, has failed to restrain volume growth and, in fact, may have exacerbated it. Although the pressure of the SGR likely minimized fee increases in the last decade, this effect disproportionately burdened physicians and health professionals in specialties with less ability to increase volume. Additionally, temporary, stop-gap “fixes” to override the SGR are undermining the credibility of Medicare because they engender uncertainty and anger among physicians and other health professionals, which may be causing anxiety among beneficiaries. The risks of retaining the SGR now clearly outweigh the benefits. Moreover, the cost of full repeal, as
well as the cost of temporary reprieves, grows inexorably. It will never be less expensive to repeal the SGR than it is right now.

With this assessment, the Commission recommends that the Congress repeal the SGR system and replace it with a 10-year schedule of specified updates for the physician fee schedule. The Commission drew on three governing principles to form our proposal. First, the link between cumulative fee-schedule expenditures and annual updates is unworkable and should be eliminated. Second, beneficiary access to care must be protected. Third, proposals to replace the SGR must be fiscally responsible.

From these principles, we recommend complete repeal of the SGR system and propose a series of updates that would no longer be based on an expenditure- or volume-control formula. These legislated updates would allow total Medicare expenditures for fee-schedule services to increase annually—roughly doubling over the next ten years. Approximately two-thirds of this increase would be attributable to growth in beneficiary enrollment and one-third would be attributable to growth in per beneficiary service use. Although our proposed updates reduce fees for most services, current law calls for far greater fee reductions and could lead to potential access problems under the SGR. The Commission finds it crucial to protect primary care from fee reductions, considering that the most recent data show that access risks are concentrated in primary care.

As is our charge, each year MedPAC will continue to review annually whether payments to physicians and other health professionals are adequate. To this end, we will continue to survey beneficiaries, conduct physician focus groups, track physician and practitioner participation in Medicare, and examine changes in volume and quality of ambulatory care. If, through these analyses, we determine that a future increase in fee-schedule rates is needed to ensure beneficiary access to care, then the Commission would submit such a recommendation to the Congress. Enacting our recommendation would eliminate the SGR and would alter the trajectory of fee-schedule spending in Medicare’s baseline. Therefore, future fee increases relative to this new baseline would require new legislation and would carry a budgetary cost.

Our recommendation for repealing the SGR carries a high budgetary cost. The Congress, of course, may seek offsets for repealing the SGR inside or outside of the Medicare program. Because MedPAC was established to advise the Congress on Medicare policies, we are offering a set of savings options that are limited to the Medicare program. We do not necessarily
recommend that the Congress offset the repeal of the SGR entirely through Medicare. The steep price of this effort, and the constraint that we imposed on ourselves to offset it within Medicare, compels difficult choices, including fee-schedule reductions and offsets that we might not otherwise support.

The Commission is also proposing refinements to the accuracy of Medicare’s physician fee schedule through targeted data collection and reducing payments for overpriced services. Even with improvements to the fee schedule’s pricing, moreover, Medicare must implement payment policies that shift providers away from fee-for-service (FFS) and toward delivery models that reward improvements in quality, efficiency, and care coordination, particularly for chronic conditions. The Commission is also recommending incentives in Medicare’s accountable care organization (ACO) program to accelerate this shift because new payment models—distinct from FFS and the SGR—have greater potential to slow volume growth while also improving care quality. Similarly, incentives for physicians and health professionals to participate in the newly established Medicare bundling pilot projects could also improve efficiency across sectors of care.

Respectfully, we submit the recommendations described below. Several of them are interrelated. Our willingness to recommend difficult measures underscores the urgency we attach to repealing the SGR. The cost of repealing the SGR, as well as the cost of any short-term reprieves, will only increase. Meanwhile, the opportunities for offsetting that cost by reducing Medicare expenditures will only shrink if Medicare savings are used for other purposes (such as, to help finance coverage for the currently uninsured or for deficit reduction). Our concern is that repealing the SGR will become increasingly difficult unless the Congress acts soon.

Repealing the SGR formula and realigning fee-schedule payments to maintain access to primary care

Repealing the SGR formula ultimately severs the link between future payment updates and cumulative expenditures for services provided by physicians and other health professionals. In place of the SGR, the Commission proposes a 10-year path of legislated updates (Figure 1). This path is consistent with the principles of an affordable repeal of the SGR, continued annual growth in Medicare spending for physician services, and maintaining access to care. For primary care, which we define more specifically later in this section, the Commission recommends that
payments rates be frozen at their current levels. For all other services, there would be reductions in the fee schedule’s conversion factor in each of the first three years, and then a freeze in the conversion factor for the subsequent seven years.\(^1\) While there would be decreases in payment rates for most services, projected growth in the volume of services—due to increases in both beneficiary enrollment in Medicare and per beneficiary service use—would lead to continued annual increases in total Medicare expenditures for fee-schedule services. We describe previous spending trends in Appendix Figure A-1.

The rationale for exempting primary care from fee-schedule cuts comes from recent research suggesting that the greatest threat to access over the next decade is concentrated in primary care services.\(^2\) In both patient surveys and physician surveys, access to primary care providers is more

\(^1\)Alternative update paths with the same approximate cost are possible. For example, fees for non-primary care services could receive smaller reductions over more years. Under this alternative, however, by year 10, the conversion factor for non-primary care services would be lower than that proposed in Figure 1.

problematic than access to specialists. These findings hold for both Medicare and privately
insured patients, magnifying the vulnerability of access to primary care services.

One example of this research comes from MedPAC’s annual patient survey that we use to obtain
the most timely data possible for analyzing access to physician services. This survey interviews
Medicare beneficiaries age 65 and over and privately insured individuals age 50 to 64. (For more
details on the survey’s methodology, please see Chapter 4 our March 2011 Report to the
Congress.) Results from this annual survey consistently find that both Medicare beneficiaries and
privately insured individuals are more likely to report problems finding a new primary care
physician compared with finding a new specialist (Appendix Table A-2). For instance, in 2010,
although only 7 percent of beneficiaries reported looking for a new primary care physician in the
past year, among those looking, 79 percent stated that they experienced no problems finding one.
In contrast 87 percent of the beneficiaries who were looking for a new specialist reported that
they had no problems finding one. Among privately insured individuals looking for a new
primary care physician, 69 percent reported no problems finding one compared with 82 percent
of those looking for a new specialist.

Consistent with this patient survey, physician surveys have also found that primary care
physicians are less likely than specialists to accept new patients. Again, this discrepancy holds
for both Medicare and privately insured patients. For example, the 2008 National Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey finds that 83 percent of primary care physicians accept new Medicare
patients, compared with 95 percent of specialists (Appendix Table A-3). Acceptance rates are
lower for patients with other insurance as well. Specifically, 76 percent of primary care
physicians accepted new patients with private (non-capitated) insurance compared with 81
percent of specialists. In a 2008 survey conducted by the Center for Studying Health System
Change, physicians who classified themselves in surgical or medical specialties were more likely
gap between specialists and primary care physicians? Health Affairs 29, no. 5 (May): 933-940; Bodenheimer, T. et
Association 301 no. 24 (June 24): 2589-2591; Rittenhouse, D. et al. 2009. Primary care and accountable care—two
essential elements of delivery-system reform. New England Journal of Medicine 361, no. 24 (December 10): 2301-
2303; Colwill, J. et al. 2008. Will generalist physician supply meet demands of an increasing and aging population?
Health Affairs 27, no. 3 (April 29): w232-w241.
than primary care physicians (classifying themselves as either in internal medicine or family/general practice) to accept all new Medicare, Medicaid, and privately insured patients.\textsuperscript{3}

Exempting primary care from the reductions would mean that Medicare payments for those services would not be based entirely on resource-based relative values. Although resources used to furnish a service (e.g., the time and intensity of effort or practice expenses incurred) are appropriately considered in establishing the fee schedule, other considerations may also be important, including ensuring access or recognizing the value of the services in terms of improving health outcomes or avoiding more costly services in the future. Market prices for goods and services outside health care often reflect such factors. The Congress has demonstrated precedent for this approach in the Medicare fee schedule, such as through the primary care and general surgery bonuses included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), as well as floors established for work and practice expense values and bonuses for services provided in health professional services shortage areas.

Regarding the proposed updates included in our recommendation to repeal the SGR, we specify a definition of primary care that focuses on protecting the practitioners and services which make up the core of primary care. The Commission limits the primary care update path to physicians and other health professionals who meet both of the following criteria:

- **Practitioner specialty designation**: Physicians who—when enrolling to bill Medicare—designated their specialty as geriatrics, internal medicine, family medicine, or pediatrics. Eligible practitioners would also include nurse practitioners, clinical nurse specialists, and physician assistants.

- **Practice focused on primary care**: Physicians and practitioners who have annual allowed Medicare charges for selected primary care services equal to at least 60 percent of their total allowed charges for fee-schedule services. Primary care services used to determine eligibility are: office visits, home visits, and visits to patients in nursing facilities, domiciliaries, and rest homes.

Under our proposal, the legislated updates for primary care would apply to the following services when provided by eligible primary care practitioners: office visits, home visits, and visits to

patients in hospitals, nursing facilities, domiciliaries, and rest homes.\textsuperscript{4} MedPAC analysis of claims data finds that under these specifications, about 9 percent of fee-schedule spending would be protected from fee reductions each year. For eligible primary care practitioners, these protected services typically account for the vast majority of their Medicare billing. Payment rates for other services—such as laceration repairs and endoscopies—furnished by all fee-schedule providers, including primary care practitioners, would be subject to the fee reductions in the first three years.\textsuperscript{5}

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<th>Other services</th>
<th>Annual payments (billion)</th>
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<td>Payment rate change</td>
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Note: The current (2011) conversion factor is $33.98.

Medicare fees for non-primary care services would be reduced by 5.9 percent each year for 3 years (Table 1). We arrive at this path after satisfying two requirements: protecting core primary care services that are furnished by primary care providers from payment reductions, and

\textsuperscript{4}Expanded definitions of primary care are possible. For example, the range of specialties could be expanded. However, protecting more services from the fee reduction will result in either a higher cost (and the need for more offsets) or a deeper fee reduction for the non-primary care services. Alternative definitions of protected services are also possible, such as using the number of unique diagnosis codes that a provider sees over the course of a year to distinguish between highly specialized providers and those that provide a more comprehensive range of care.

\textsuperscript{5}The freeze on payment rates for primary care could be implemented either with a separate conversion factor, or with a claims-based payment modifier. If the freeze is implemented with a claims-based payment modifier, a single, reduced conversion factor would apply to all services; but, for eligible primary care services, the payment modifier would increase the fee and effectively reverse the conversion factor reduction.
achieving a total estimated 10-year cost that is no more than $200 billion. If the update paths depicted in Figure 1 were implemented in 2012, the conversion factor for non-primary care would decrease over a period of three years from the current level of $33.98 to about $28.34. It would then stay at that level for the remaining seven years of the budget window. By contrast, under current law, the conversion factor would be $24.27 at the end of the budget window. Taking into account the increase in the number of Medicare beneficiaries over the next 10 years and growth in the volume of services provided per beneficiary, total practitioner payments from Medicare would rise from $64 billion to $121 billion. On a per beneficiary basis, practitioner payments would continue to rise at an average rate of 2.2 percent per year. The $200 billion estimated cost of this proposed update path accounts for the cost of eliminating the significantly larger SGR cuts and replacing them with the updates specified in Table 1.

A freeze in payment levels for primary care is not sufficient to support a robust system of primary care. Payment approaches that recognize the benefits of non-face-to-face care coordination between visits and among providers may be more appropriate for primary care, particularly for patients with chronic conditions. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is embarking on several projects to examine the results (patient health and total spending outcomes) of monthly per-patient payments to primary care providers for their care coordination activities. These include the Comprehensive Primary Care Initiative, the Multipayer Advanced Primary Care Initiative, and the Federally Qualified Health Center Advanced Primary Care Practice Demonstration. Issues that this work will help to inform include patient involvement in selecting these providers and effective ways for attributing one eligible provider per patient.

**Recommendation 1:**

The Congress should repeal the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system and replace it with a 10-year path of statutory fee-schedule updates. This path is comprised of a freeze in current payment levels for primary care and, for all other services, annual payment reductions of 5.9 percent for three years, followed by a freeze. The Commission is offering a list of options for the Congress to consider if it decides to offset the cost of repealing the SGR system within the Medicare program.
Collecting data to improve payment accuracy

In addition to a conversion factor, the physician fee schedule includes relative value units (RVUs). These RVUs account for the amount of work required to provide each service, the expenses that practitioners incur related to maintaining a practice, and malpractice insurance costs. To arrive at the payment amount for a given service, its RVUs are adjusted for variations in the input prices in different markets, and then the total of the adjusted RVUs is multiplied by the conversion factor.

The Secretary lacks current, objective data needed to set the fee schedule’s RVUs for practitioner work and practice expenses.6 The fee schedule’s time estimates are an example. The RVUs for practitioner work are largely a function of estimates of the time it takes a practitioner to perform each service. However, research for CMS and for the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation of the Department of Health and Human Services has shown that the time estimates are likely too high for some services. In addition, anecdotal evidence and the experience of clinicians on the Commission suggest problems with the accuracy of the time estimates. Furthermore, under CMS’s recent potentially misvalued services initiative, time estimates for a number of services have been revised downward after consultation with the Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC). These revisions suggest that current time estimates—which rely primarily on surveys conducted by physician specialty societies that have a financial stake in the process—are subject to bias.

Reliable, objective data are also needed for the fee schedule’s practice expense RVUs. CMS’s methodology for determining these RVUs relies on various types of data: time estimates for clinical employees who work in practitioners’ offices, prices for equipment and supplies used in practitioners’ offices, and total practice costs for each physician specialty. The Commission questions the accuracy and timeliness of these data.7

The Commission evaluated sources of data the Secretary could consider. Surveys might be an alternative, but they are costly and response rates are likely to be low. Time and motion studies

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would be costly, too, and they are subject to bias. And mandatory data reporting—analogous to the cost reports submitted by institutional providers—would raise issues of administrative burden on practitioners.

Instead of these approaches, the Secretary could collect data on a recurring basis from a cohort of practitioner offices and other settings where practitioners work. Participating practices and other settings could be recruited through a process that would require participation in data reporting among those selected. The cohort would consist of practices with a range of specialties, practitioner types, patient populations, and furnished services. Further, the cohort should consist of practices with features that make them efficient (e.g., economies of scale, reorganized delivery systems). If necessary, practices could be paid to participate. The Commission is working with contractors to assess the potential of using electronic health records, patient scheduling systems, cost accounting, and other systems as sources of data in physician practices and integrated delivery systems.

**Recommendation 2:**

The Congress should direct the Secretary to regularly collect data—including service volume and work time—to establish more accurate work and practice expense values. To help assess whether Medicare’s fees are adequate for efficient care delivery, the data should be collected from a cohort of efficient practices rather than a sample of all practices. The initial round of data collection should be completed within three years.

**Identifying overpriced services**

Moving forward from the SGR could also include a change in the process for identifying overpriced services in the physician fee schedule. The current process for identifying potentially misvalued services is time consuming, occurring over several years. In addition, the process has inherent conflicts. The process relies on surveys conducted by physician specialty societies. Those societies and their members have a financial stake in the RVUs assigned to services.

To accelerate the review process, the Secretary should be directed to analyze the data collected under recommendation 2, identify overpriced services, and adjust the RVUs of those services. Further, the Congress should direct the Secretary to achieve an annual numeric goal equivalent to
a percentage of fee-schedule spending. This would be a goal for reducing the RVUs of 
overpriced services. These adjustments should be implemented in a budget neutral manner. 
Therefore, while payments could decrease considerably for any given overpriced service, they 
would increase slightly for all other services.

As mentioned earlier, the RUC and CMS have started a potentially misvalued services initiative, 
and there is some evidence that this effort has drawn attention to inaccurate pricing. As an 
example, for fee schedule payments in 2011, CMS received work RVU recommendations from 
the RUC for 291 billing codes and made decisions after considering all of those 
recommendations.8 In some cases, comprehensive billing codes were established that bundled 
component services, thereby recognizing that efficiencies can arise when multiple services are 
furnished during a single patient encounter. Other recommendations did not include a change in 
billing codes. Instead, the RUC had addressed the question of whether current RVUs are too high 
or too low for certain services because of a change in technology or other factors. The net effect 
of the increases and decreases in work RVUs—had the changes not been budget neutral, as 
required by statute—would have been a reduction in spending under the fee schedule of 0.4 
percent. Previously, the net effects of work RVU changes had been smaller: 0.1 percent per year 
in both 2009 and 2010.

The American Medical Association’s (AMA’s) position is that the process for identifying 
potentially misvalued services has been broader in scope than that suggested by these budget 
neutrality adjustments.9 The AMA reports that in addition to about $400 million that was 
redistributed for 2011 due to changes in work RVUs, another $40 million was redistributed due 
to changes in the RVUs for professional liability insurance, and $565 million was redistributed 
due to changes in practice expense RVUs.

An annual numeric goal for RVU reductions—stated in terms of a percentage of spending for 
practitioner services—could foster further collaboration between the RUC and CMS in improving

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8 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Department of Health and Human Services. 2010. Medicare program; 
payment policies under the physician fee schedule and other revisions to Part B for CY 2011. Final rule. Federal 
Register 75, no. 228 (November 29): 73169-73860.
payment accuracy. For example, such a goal should focus the effort on high-expenditure services, thereby making a time-consuming and resource-intensive review process more efficient. In addition, collecting objective data to improve payment accuracy—the data collection addressed by recommendation 2—will make the process more effective. As to the level of the numeric goal, judgment is required. If the AMA’s estimates are accurate, RVU changes for 2011 led to a redistribution of payments equaling almost 1.2 percent of total allowed charges.

Recommendation 3:

The Congress should direct the Secretary to identify overpriced fee-schedule services and reduce their relative value units (RVUs) accordingly. To fulfill this requirement, the Secretary could use the data collected under the process in recommendation 2. These reductions should be budget neutral within the fee schedule. Starting in 2015, the Congress should specify that the RVU reductions achieve an annual numeric goal—for each of five consecutive years—of at least 1.0 percent of fee-schedule spending.

Accelerate delivery system changes to emphasize accountability and value over volume

Even with more accurate RVU assignments, the FFS payment system inherently encourages volume over quality and efficiency. Indeed, rapid volume growth in the last decade is due, in large part, to the underlying volume incentives in FFS reimbursement. New payment models, such as the ACO program and new bundled payment initiatives, present an opportunity to correct some of the undesirable incentives in FFS and reward providers who are doing their part to control costs and improve quality.

Repealing the SGR provides an opportunity for Medicare to implement policies that encourage physicians and other health professionals to move toward delivery models with better accountability for quality and value. With this shift, we should see a greater focus on population health and care coordination—thereby improving patient experience and aligning incentives for beneficiaries to become more engaged with their own care management. Through the ACO program and bundled payment approaches, Medicare is taking important steps in this direction—embarking on new payment models that can encourage providers to work together across sectors to maximize quality and efficiency.
Within the ACO program, incentives for these improvements are strongest for ACOs which bear financial risk, often called two-sided risk ACOs. These ACOs are eligible for both rewards and penalties based on their performance on quality and spending measures. In contrast, bonus-only ACOs are not subject to performance-based penalties. Therefore, the Commission recommends aligning policies related to Medicare’s fee schedule with incentives for physicians and health professionals to join or lead two-sided risk ACOs.

Specifically, the Commission recommends that physicians and health professionals who join or lead two-sided risk ACOs should be afforded a greater opportunity for shared savings compared to those in bonus-only ACOs and those who do not join any ACO. The greater opportunity for shared savings would come from calculating the two-sided risk ACO’s spending benchmark using higher-than-actual fee-schedule growth rates.

More precisely, assuming the initial reduction in fee-schedule rates outlined in our first recommendation, the Commission recommends that the spending benchmarks for assessing the performance of two-sided risk ACOs be calculated using a freeze in fee-schedule rates, rather than the actual fee reductions. Under this circumstance, two-sided risk ACOs would have a greater opportunity to produce spending that is below their benchmark, and thus be more likely to enjoy shared-savings payments from Medicare.¹⁰

This recommendation might increase the willingness of physicians and other health professionals to join or lead two-sided risk ACOs. In doing so, it would accelerate delivery system reform toward models with greater accountability for health care quality and spending. As ACO models develop and make strides in improving quality and efficiency, the volume-based FFS environment should be made increasingly less attractive for Medicare providers. Accordingly, the advantage offered to the two-sided risk ACOs would increase in the second and third year that the fee-schedule reductions are in place.

¹⁰ One issue to examine under this policy would be to monitor the effect of differential payments for services provided by ACO and non-ACO providers. The differential shared savings opportunities are intended to hasten improvements in our delivery system and shift payments away from FFS. The incentives should be revisited as enrollment increases to ensure that ACOs are having the desired effect of encouraging more organized care delivery and lowering overall spending growth.
Final regulations on the ACO program are not yet completed. Therefore, it is difficult to
determine the effects of this recommendation, relative to current law. Theoretically, by offering
providers a greater opportunity to share in Medicare savings, the Commission’s recommendation
could reduce total Medicare savings. However, more importantly, if more providers decided to
join two-sided risk ACOs as a result of greater shared savings opportunities in this
recommendation, total Medicare savings could increase over the long term.

**Recommendation 4:**

*Under the 10-year update path specified in recommendation 1, the Congress should direct the
Secretary to increase the shared savings opportunity for physicians and health professionals
who join or lead two-sided risk accountable care organizations (ACOs). The Secretary should compute spending benchmarks for these ACOs using 2011 fee-schedule rates.*

The Secretary could also consider developing analogous pricing incentives in Medicare’s new
bundled payment initiatives. That is, in the context of fee-reductions, bundled pricing would assume
a rate freeze across all fee-schedule services. In testing this approach for improvements in quality
and efficiency, the Secretary could, at the same time, assess the effect that bundled payments have
on growth in the total number of episodes.

**Offsetting the cost of the SGR package**

The Commission describes a budget-neutral package for repealing the SGR, offsetting the cost
within the Medicare program (Appendix Table A-4). Under current law, the SGR calls for a very
large fee reduction (30 percent on January 1, 2012) and the budget score associated with
repealing the SGR has grown exponentially. Given the high cost of repealing the SGR and the
current economic environment, the Commission’s proposal must be fiscally responsible.

The list of options offered by the Commission spreads the cost of repealing the SGR across
physicians and other practitioners, as well as other providers and Medicare beneficiaries. Under
the Commission’s approach, physicians and other practitioners who provide non-primary care
services will experience a series of Medicare fee reductions, followed by a freeze in payment
rates. Primary care physicians and other primary care practitioners would experience a freeze in rates for the primary care services they provide. Through these reductions and freezes, physicians and other health professionals are shouldering a large part of the cost of repealing the SGR. The cost of repealing the SGR and replacing it with a complete freeze in fee-schedule payment rates would be approximately $300 billion over ten years, but the Commission’s approach would cost approximately $200 billion, with most physicians and practitioners absorbing $100 billion in the form of lower payments than they would receive under a freeze.

To offset this $200 billion in higher Medicare spending relative to current law (which applies the SGR fee cuts), the Congress may seek offsets inside or outside of the Medicare program. Because MedPAC was established to advise the Congress on Medicare policies, we are offering a set of savings options that are limited to the Medicare program. We do not necessarily recommend that the Congress offset the repeal of the SGR entirely through Medicare. Also, we offer this set of options with the express purpose of assisting the Congress in evaluating ways to repeal the SGR. The steep price of this effort, and the constraint that we are under to offset it within Medicare, compels difficult choices, including fee-schedule payment reductions and offsets that we might not otherwise support.

The offset options listed in Appendix Table A-4 would spread the impact of the reductions across other providers and Medicare beneficiaries. They are grouped in two categories. Those in Tier I—about $50 billion—are MedPAC recommendations not yet enacted by the Congress. Those in Tier II—about $168 billion—are informed by analyses done by MedPAC, other commissions, and government agencies. Several of the options in Tier II are designed to make changes to Medicare payments to encourage the use of more cost effective care. The estimates of savings are preliminary staff estimates and do not represent official scores.

The Commission has not voted on each individual item in the Tier II list, and their inclusion should not be construed as a recommendation. Tier II does not include all of the proposals that have been offered for reducing long-term Medicare spending—e.g., increasing the age of eligibility, or requiring higher contributions from beneficiaries with higher-than-average incomes, or premium support. The exclusion of such policies should not be construed as a
statement of MedPAC’s position on these policies. Such policies raise complex issues that are beyond the scope of Tier II offsets.

To reiterate, we offer the list of offset options to assist the Congress in its deliberations on resolving the SGR problem. The Congress could choose different directions to offset the related cost—for example, other spending or revenue offsets, even from outside the Medicare program.

In closing, given the urgency of the need to resolve the SGR policy, the Commission is submitting this letter to the Congress in advance of our usual March and June publication schedule. At a minimum our proposal underscores the exigency of the matter, the complexity of deriving any solution, and the degree of sacrifice a resolution entails. If you have further questions or otherwise wish to discuss this important issue, please feel free to contact me or Mark E. Miller, MedPAC’s Executive Director.

Sincerely,

Glenn M. Hackbarth, J.D.
Chairman
# Appendix

## Table A-1

### Commissioners’ voting on recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The Congress should repeal the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system and replace it with a 10-year path of statutory fee-schedule updates. This path is comprised of a freeze in current payment levels for primary care and, for all other services, annual payment reductions of 5.9 percent for three years, followed by a freeze. The Commission is offering a list of options for the Congress to consider if it decides to offset the cost of repealing the SGR system within the Medicare program.</td>
<td>Armstrong, Baicler, Behroozi, Berenson, Butler, Cheenew, Dean, Gradison, Hackbarth, Hall, Kuhn, Miller, Naylor, Stuart, Uccello  No: Borman, Castellanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Congress should direct the Secretary to regularly collect data—including service volume and work time—to establish more accurate and practice expense values. To help assess whether Medicare’s fees are adequate for efficient care delivery, the data should be collected from a cohort of efficient practices rather than a sample of all practices. The initial round of data collection should be completed within three years.</td>
<td>Armstrong, Baicler, Behroozi, Berenson, Borman, Butler, Castellanos, Cheenew, Dean, Gradison, Hackbarth, Hall, Kuhn, Miller, Naylor, Stuart, Uccello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>The Congress should direct the Secretary to identify overpriced fee-schedule services and reduce their relative value units (RVUs) accordingly. To fulfill this requirement, the Secretary could use the data collected under the process in recommendation 2. These reductions should be budget neutral within the fee schedule. Starting in 2015, the Congress should specify that the RVU reductions achieve an annual numeric goal—for each of five consecutive years—of at least 1.0 percent of fee-schedule spending.</td>
<td>Armstrong, Baicler, Behroozi, Berenson, Butler, Castellanos, Cheenew, Dean, Gradison, Hackbarth, Hall, Kuhn, Miller, Naylor, Stuart, Uccello  No: Borman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Under the 10-year update path specified in recommendation 1, the Congress should direct the Secretary to increase the shared savings opportunity for physicians and health professionals who join or lead two-sided risk accountable care organizations (ACOs). The Secretary should compute spending benchmarks for these ACOs using 2011 fee-schedule rates.</td>
<td>Armstrong, Baicler, Bebroozi, Berenson, Butler, Castellanos, Dean, Gradison, Hackbarth, Hall, Kuhn, Miller, Naylor, Stuart, Uccello  No: Borman  Not voting: Cheenew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Spending for fee-schedule services grew from $37 billion in 2000 to $64 billion in 2010—an increase of 72 percent.

• On a per beneficiary basis, spending grew over this period from $1,200 to $2,000—an increase of 64 percent. This increase amounts to an average annual spending increase of 5 percent per beneficiary, per year.

• Medicare spending on fee-schedule services grew much more rapidly over this period than both the payment rate updates and the Medicare Economic Index (MEI). The cumulative increase in fee-schedule updates from 2000 to 2010 was 8 percent. The comparable cumulative increase in the MEI was 22 percent.

• The growth in spending per beneficiary was due more to growth in the volume and intensity of services provided than to fee increases. The volume of imaging, tests, and “other procedures” (procedures other than major procedures) grew more rapidly than the volume of major procedures and evaluation and management services.
### TABLE A-2

**Most aged Medicare beneficiaries and older privately insured individuals have good access to physician care, 2007-2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey question</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unwanted delay in getting an appointment:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Among those who needed an appointment in the past 12 months, “How often did you have to wait longer than you wanted to get a doctor’s appointment?”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>For routine care</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>75%*</td>
<td>76%*</td>
<td>77%*</td>
<td>75%*</td>
<td>67%*</td>
<td>69%*</td>
<td>71%*</td>
<td>72%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>18*</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>22*</td>
<td>21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5*</td>
<td>3*</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>For illness or injury</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>82*</td>
<td>84*</td>
<td>85*</td>
<td>83*</td>
<td>76*</td>
<td>79*</td>
<td>79*</td>
<td>80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>16*</td>
<td>17*</td>
<td>15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Almost</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Looking for a new primary care physician:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>“In the past 12 months, have you tried to get a new primary care doctor?”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Looking for a new specialist:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“In the past 12 months, have you tried to get a new specialist?”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>13*</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>19*</td>
<td>15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85*</td>
<td>86*</td>
<td>87*</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>81*</td>
<td>81*</td>
<td>84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Getting a new physician:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among those who tried to get an appointment with a new primary care physician or a specialist in the past 12 months, “How much of a problem was it finding a primary care doctor / specialist who would treat you? Was it...”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Primary care physician</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No problem</td>
<td>70*</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79*</td>
<td>82*</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small problem</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big problem</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21*</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specialist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>87*</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small problem</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big problem</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not accessing a doctor for medical problems:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“During the past 12 months, did you have any health problem or condition about which you think you should have seen a doctor or other medical person, but did not?” (Percent answering “Yes”)</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>7*</td>
<td>8*</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>12*</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>12*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers may not sum to 100 percent because missing responses ("Don’t know" or "Refused") are not presented. Overall sample sizes for each group (Medicare and privately insured) were 2,000 in 2007, 3,000 in 2008, and 4,000 in 2009 and 2010. Sample sizes for individual questions varied.

*Statistically significant difference between the Medicare and privately insured samples in the given year at a 75 percent confidence level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accepting new patients type of insurance</th>
<th>Primary care specialties</th>
<th>All other specialties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any new patients</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicare</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>68.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitated private insurance</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-capitated private insurance</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ compensation</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-pay</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>95.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No charge</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results include office-based physicians with at least 10 percent of practice revenue coming from Medicare.

Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics, National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (2008).
• Along with the recommendations included in this letter, the Commission is offering a set of savings options for the purpose of assisting the Congress in offsetting the budgetary cost of repealing the SGR system. The projected savings amounts are unofficial, based on MedPAC staff estimates, and subject to change.

• The options are divided into two tiers. Tier I—about $50 billion—contains proposals that have been recommended by the Commission in previous reports or comment letters. Tier II—about $170 billion—contains options informed by outside (e.g., the Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services; Congressional Budget Office options) and MedPAC staff analysis. The Commission has not voted on or recommended the items on the Tier II list. The exclusion of policies from this list should not be construed as a statement of MedPAC’s position on such policies.

• In the statute creating MedPAC, the Congress charges the Commission with reviewing Medicare policies, including their relationship to access and quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries. Therefore, all of the offset options on this list are Medicare policies; the Congress could choose to employ other savings or revenue offsets including those from outside of Medicare.
### Potential Medicare offset options for repealing the SGR system

#### Tier I: MedPAC work

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Tier I: MedPAC work</th>
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**Subtotal, MedPAC work** 25 50

#### Tier II: Other Medicare

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**Subtotal, Other Medicare** 64 168

**Total, Tier I and Tier II** 89 219

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Note: ASC (ambulatory surgical centers), CBO (Congressional Budget Office), DCI (documentation and coding improvements), DME (durable medical equipment), E&M (evaluation and management), HH (home health), HHS (Department of Health and Human Services), IRF (inpatient rehabilitation facilities), LTCH (long-term care hospitals), LIS (low-income subsidy), MA (Medicare Advantage), OIG (Office of Inspector General), PB (provider bulletin), SNF (skilled nursing facility). The Commission is offering a set of savings options for the purpose of assisting the Congress in offsetting the budgetary cost of repealing the SGR. The projected savings amounts are unofficial, based on MedPAC staff estimates, and subject to change.

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22